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ABSTRACT

THE EFFECTS OF INTER-INDUSTRY MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS ON
THE LONG-TERM VOLATILITY OF EQUITY RETURNS

Collin D. Myers
Finance Department
Bachelor of Science in Finance

The objective of this research was to discover whether a significant relationship
exists between the theoretically diversifying effects of inter-industry mergers and
acquisitions (“M&A”) and changes in the volatilities of acquisitive firms’ publicly-traded
equity security returns (measured as the standard deviation of percentage changes in
price) from pre-transaction announcement to post-transaction completion. My hypothesis
is that a negative relationship should exist between changes in a firm’s equity return
volatility over time and whether the firm completes a diversifying acquisition, which I
define as one in which the target firm primarily operates in a different industry than the
acquirer. 980 diversifying and 9256 non-diversifying M&A transactions announced and
completed between January 1980 and June 2017 were included in this research. When
various systematic and idiosyncratic factors which affect the volatility of equity returns
were controlled in a multiple regression, a statistically significant, negative relationship
was discovered between whether a firm completes a diversifying acquisition and the
change in the firm’s equity return volatility from a pre-transaction announcement period
to a post-transaction completion period. All factors considered in the multiple regression
iii

were found to be statistically significant. The multiple regression results also suggest
that the most significant factors influencing changes in acquirers’ equity return
volatilities during the time periods surrounding M&A transactions are idiosyncratic.
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I.

Introduction
Mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”) transactions typically have significant impacts

on the characteristics of the firms involved. With over $25.7tn in global, announced
transaction value between 2014 and 2018, mergers and acquisitions affect a large
percentage of firms across the globe each year (Bloomberg 2019). The announcement and
evolution of an M&A transaction provides securities and derivatives markets with a
substantial amount of novel information regarding the companies involved and the
industries in which they compete (Waldman & Jensen 2001). In relatively efficient capital
markets this new information is impounded quickly into the prices of related securities by
market participants, increasing the securities’ short-term return volatility (measured as
the standard deviation of percentage changes in price, σ) surrounding the transactions’
announcements (Brown et al. 1988; Lee et al. 1994; Smith et al. 1997; Rodrigues et al.
2012). While the various effects of M&A transactions on the return volatilities of affected
equity securities during the periods between transaction announcements and completions
have been thoroughly researched, relatively little attention has been given to the effects
of M&A transactions on the return volatilities of these same securities during posttransaction completion periods. Research which is focused on discovering and
understanding the primary factors affecting changes in relevant equity return volatilities
across the time periods surrounding M&A transactions is even more scarce.
A thorough understanding among capital and derivatives markets participants of
the trends in and drivers of the volatility of various security returns is a critical factor
influencing the overall efficiency of these markets. This understanding is an important
market efficiency factor because observed and expected security volatility levels influence
many of the decisions made by market participants. For instance, the standard deviation
1

of the historical returns of a security or portfolio is a figure regularly used both in
academic research and the financial services industry as a measure of the total risk of the
security or portfolio. This measure of total risk is also a critical input in portfolio
optimization models, as well as models which are used to value securities, portfolios, and
related derivative instruments (Markowitz 1952; Sharpe 1964; Black & Scholes 1973).
Therefore, an improved understanding of the effects of factors which influence changes
in the overall return volatilities of the equity securities of firms involved in mergers and
acquisitions is valuable to both the firms and financial market participants involved.
This paper attempts to expand the body of literature focused on understanding
the factors which influence the volatility of equity security returns across time by
discovering whether or not a significant relationship exists between long-term changes
in the volatility of acquisitive firms’ publicly-traded equity returns and the diversifying
nature of certain M&A transactions. I define a diversifying transaction as one in which
the target firm primarily operates in a different industry than the industry in which the
acquiring firm primarily operates. If an M&A transaction diversifies the acquirer’s
underlying cash flows in this manner, a dampening effect on the daily standard deviation
of the acquirer’s equity returns may be observed over time, similar to the volatilitydampening effects of adding securities whose returns negatively covary to a single
portfolio. That the addition of negatively-covarying securities to a single portfolio
decreases the idiosyncratic and overall risk of the portfolio has been thoroughly
demonstrated in the literature, beginning with Markowitz (Markowitz 1952). However,
the effects of combining previously separate firms which primarily operate in different
industries (and therefore generate somewhat independent, uncorrelated cash flows) on
the resulting daily equity return volatility of the securities representing ownership in the
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surviving firm have not been thoroughly studied. When beginning this research, I
predicted that a statistically significant decrease in the mean daily standard deviation of
the equity security returns of firms which have acquired diversifying target firms would
be observed across time from each pre-transaction announcement period to each posttransaction completion period. My hypothesis is that a portion of this decrease in mean
equity return volatility would be significantly related to the diversifying nature of the
transactions completed by these firms.

II.

Literature Review
The effects of M&A transactions on the return volatilities of the equity securities

of both acquisitive and target firms during the various time periods surrounding M&A
transactions have generally been well researched. The extant literature tends to focus on
changes in the equity return volatilities of firms which have been targeted by takeover
bids and the conditional, expected equity return volatilities implied by changes in related
options prices after M&A transactions have been announced (Hutson & Kearney 2001;
Geppert & Kamerschen 2008). It has been demonstrated that in both pre- and posttransaction announcement periods the daily standard deviations of the returns of equity
securities affected by these significant releases of new information increase dramatically
as market participants attempt to incorporate and price said information (Brown et al.
1988; Lee et al. 1994; Smith et al. 1997; Rodrigues et al. 2012). Bid-ask spreads on the
prices of relevant equity securities tend to widen as the level of uncertainty regarding the
future cash flows to be generated by the assets underlying these securities increases
during post-transaction announcement periods (Jennings 1994). This increase in
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uncertainty among market participants drives increases in the volatility of relevant equity
securities’ returns during post-transaction announcement periods. It has also been shown
that capital market participants expect the cash flows to be generated by entities resulting
from successful M&A transactions to have increased risk due to various integration
frictions which may exist post-transaction completion. Expectations of new integration
frictions also typically drive an increase in the daily standard deviation of the surviving
entity’s equity security returns for a time (Brown et al. 1988; Lee et al. 1994; Geppert &
Kamerschen 2008).
Extensive research has been completed which examines the effects of mergers and
acquisitions on the daily equity return standard deviations of securities representing
ownership in firms operating in specific industries and over certain periods of time (Shim
2011; Pessahna et al. 2016; Chang & Cho 2017). Still other research has been conducted
which examines the effects of M&A transactions on changes in the equity return volatility
of firms whose operations are exposed to differing geographical and political factors (Zhu
et al. 2014).
Research which analyzes the effects of diversification on the total volatility of a
portfolio of securities is also extensive. Markowitz was one of the earliest researchers to
show that increased diversification, or the addition of securities to a portfolio whose
covariance of returns relative to that same portfolio are negative, decreases the total and
idiosyncratic risk of the portfolio (Markowitz 1952). This understanding is so
fundamental that most models used for pricing capital assets assume that investors are
well-diversified and demand no additional return for bearing idiosyncratic (firm-specific)
risk because it may be mitigated at little to no marginal cost through diversification
(Goetzmann & Kumar 2001). Conversely, when well-diversified portfolios are broken into
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their component parts, the average risk observed across all previously-constituent
positions tends to be higher than the total risk of the original, well-diversified portfolio.
This increase in mean volatility occurs as the effects of diversification are removed. The
effects of lowering the level of diversification within a portfolio on the total volatility of
the portfolio’s returns may also be observed when analyzing the risk of equity securities
representing ownership in entities which were previously combined within a single firm
and represented by a single, publicly traded equity security. For instance, it has been
shown that in the event of a conglomerate break-up, observed increases in the mean
return standard deviations of the equity securities representing ownership in the newlyseparated firms are caused, at least in part, by the lessening of the effects of diversification
on the economic sensitivities of cash flows previously generated by a single firm and
represented by a single security (Desai & Savickas 2010).
However, very little research has been completed which investigates the primary
drivers of changes in the daily return standard deviations of equity securities affected by
the opposite phenomena; that is, the effects of diversifying mergers and acquisitions on
the post-transaction completion return volatilities of equity securities representing
ownership in newly combined entities. There is one, currently unpublished, exception
(Bharath & Wu 2006). However, this paper only compares the scaled changes in equity
return volatilities from the pre-transaction announcement to post-transaction completion
periods between acquirers involved in intra- and inter-industry M&A transactions and
does not control for several important systematic and industry-specific factors which
influence the volatility of equity returns. There are also several significant statistical
control issues inherent in their approach which I attempt to overcome in this analysis,
and which are treated further in the Data and Methodology section.

5

III.

Hypothesis Development

The fundamental aspects of Modern Portfolio Theory (“MPT”) are set forth in
Harry Markowitz’s seminal paper Portfolio Selection (Markowitz 1952). Importantly,
Markowitz established that investors will seek not only to hold portfolios which
maximize their expected return but will also simultaneously attempt to minimize the
standard deviation of percentage changes in the value of their portfolios over time. This
quantification of investment risk as the volatility of a portfolio’s or security’s returns is a
relatively robust figure still widely cited today. Therefore, Markowitz’s research
demonstrated that sophisticated investors will attempt to maximize the amount of return
they expect from a portfolio given a certain level of risk (the expected volatility of the
portfolio’s returns).
Diversification plays a key role in this portfolio optimization effort. Diversification
involves an investor simultaneously holding multiple assets whose returns negatively
covary within a single portfolio. As the number of risky assets with negatively-covarying
returns that are added to a portfolio approaches infinity, the overall portfolio return
volatility decreases towards a positive limit representing risk that cannot be mitigated
through diversification (Bollerslev et al. 1988). This risk which cannot be mitigated
through diversification is systematic in nature. Thus, diversification helps to mitigate the
portion of a portfolio’s return volatility which is driven by the idiosyncratic developments
affecting the return volatility of the individual securities of which the portfolio is
comprised. However, as a portfolio becomes more diversified and the total risk of the
portfolio decreases the portfolio’s level of expected return does not necessarily decrease
proportionately. When tilting a portfolio towards a security causes the total risk of the
portfolio to decrease in larger proportion than the potential decrease in the expected
6

return of the portfolio, the Sharpe ratio of the portfolio increases. This ratio is expressed
as:

𝐸[𝑟𝑝 ] − 𝑟𝑓
σ𝑝

where E[rp] is the expected return of the portfolio, rf is the risk-free interest rate, and 𝜎p
is the standard deviation of the natural log of historical percentage changes in the value
of the portfolio. When the Sharpe ratio of a portfolio increases it is a positive development
for investors who hold the portfolio, as it is assumed that all investors attempt to
maximize their level of risk-adjusted returns within the context of varying idiosyncratic
constraints. To understand how diversification can help investors increase the Sharpe
ratios of their portfolios through the reduction of idiosyncratic risk, it is important to
understand how securities are priced.
A security’s intrinsic value is a function of two major factors: the future cash flows
the assets underlying the security are expected to generate as well as various risks
associated with these expected cash flows. The major risks associated with these expected
cash flows are that that the times at which investors receive them and their values may
differ from investors’ initial expectations. Both the times at which cash flows generated
by the assets underlying a security are to be received, as well as the future values of the
cash flows, influence investor’s estimations of the present, intrinsic value of a security.
This is represented by the function:
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𝑃𝑡=0 = ∑𝑡 (

𝐶𝐹𝑡
)
(1 + 𝑟)𝑡

where Pt=0 denotes the current intrinsic value of the security, CFt denotes the expected
cash flow(s) to be received in period t, and r is the required rate of return on the security.
Prices of securities in efficient markets represent investors’ estimations of the securities’
intrinsic values given specific expected return and risk levels, and fully reflect all publicly
available information, Φt (Fama 1970).
Investors’ expectations regarding the size and timing of these cash flows are
influenced by both systematic and idiosyncratic factors. These idiosyncratic factors differ
widely among firms and will uniquely influence investors’ expectations of the size and
timing of cash flows to be generated by different companies during the same time period.
For example, a firm may have issues with members of their board of directors which
negatively impact investors’ expectations of the firm’s future earnings, but this event has
little to no correlation with changes in these same investors’ expectations regarding the
size and timing of the cash flows to be generated by other firms; thus, this is an
idiosyncratic development. A defining feature of a firm’s idiosyncratic developments is
that they are relatively independent, meaning that their level of correlation with other
firm’s idiosyncratic developments are very low. Therefore, combining securities
representing claims on the cash flows generated by different firms within a single
portfolio serves to mitigate the risk of any one firm’s idiosyncratic developments having
a large positive or negative influence on the overall portfolio returns and thus reduces the
level of idiosyncratic risk present within the portfolio. If one substitutes the total cash
flows expected to be generated by the assets underlying a portfolio of securities for the
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expected cash flows to be received from holding a single security in the intrinsic value
formula given previously, one can immediately see that the intrinsic value of a portfolio
is driven by the interaction of the expected return and risk of the individual securities
which comprise the portfolio. Thus, mitigating the level of idiosyncratic risk present
within a portfolio through increased diversification tends to increase the intrinsic value
of the portfolio and can increase its Sharpe ratio as well, as risk is represented in the
denominator of both the present value function and the Sharpe ratio. Diversification is
therefore a critical element of most investors’ portfolio optimization efforts.
However, while this simplistic view of security and portfolio valuation is
informative, many firms do not generate earnings from a single business unit operating
within a single industry, and therefore these firms generate diverse cash flows which
cannot easily be assigned a single, accurate discount factor. While the weighted average
cost of capital (“WACC”) allows investors to quantify the risks associated with these
diverse cash flows and thus approximate a firm-wide discount factor, the underlying
distributions representing the volatilities of a firm’s debt and equity securities may be
non-stationary, especially as their proportions within the capital structure change in the
time periods surrounding M&A transactions (Choi & Richardson 2016). This figure also
provides investors with no predictive information regarding a diversified firm’s future
debt and equity return volatilities that may result from new combinations of negativelycovarying, cash-flow generating assets. When diverse, cash flow generating assets are
combined within a single firm through M&A transactions, the unique risk/return profile
of the combination of these assets will significantly affect the degree to which investors
react to changes in idiosyncratic and systematic factor values in determining the intrinsic
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valuation of the firm, and therefore will have significant effects on the firm’s future
standard deviation of equity returns over time.
Many firms are either the combination of previously separate firms brought
together through M&A transactions or have organically developed diverse business
segments. In either case, these firms simultaneously operate in different industries and
therefore generate cash flows which have differing sensitivities to economic risk factors.
In recent decades several global M&A waves have occurred, beginning in the 1990s (Xu
2017). M&A transactions involve firms purchasing or selling assets, business segments,
or entire companies outright. M&A exists as a strategic alternative to firms developing
technology, hiring top talent, or gaining market share organically. M&A transactions are
especially attractive to companies seeking to diversify their operations, as this method of
diversification typically requires less effort from the acquiring firm than attempting to
organically develop a diverse portfolio of operations. Whether for this reason or others,
firms often purchase and/or merge with other firms whose cash flow risk is driven by
fundamentally different economic factors; that is, previously separate assets generating
cash flows with differing sensitivities to changes in economic risk factors are combined
within a single entity. As previously discussed, combining these diverse cash flows within
a firm represented by a single publicly-traded equity security may have effects on the
volatility of the returns of said security which are similar to the volatility dampening
effects of combining securities with negatively-covarying returns within a single
portfolio.
These points together indicate that statistically significant differences between
changes in the standard deviations of returns over time should exist between the equity
securities of firms which have successfully completed diversifying mergers and
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acquisitions and those that have not but are otherwise comparable. The hypothesis put
forward in this paper, then, is that a statistically significant difference should exist
between the changes in the daily equity return standard deviations of acquisitive,
diversifying firms, and a group of non-acquisitive control firms across the time periods
surrounding the announcement and completion of diversifying M&A transactions, and
that this difference will be significantly related to the diversifying nature of these
acquisitions. I also hypothesize that the relationship between the diversifying nature of
the acquisitions and the differences in the changes in equity return volatilities will be
found to be negative, as increasing the level of diversification within the underlying cash
flows generated by the newly combined firms should lower the average equity return
volatility of the diversifying acquirers over time. Said differently, I hypothesize that the
mean equity return volatility of diversifying acquirers over time will become
proportionately smaller than the mean equity return volatility of non-acquisitive control
firms over the same periods of time surrounding the acquisitive firms’ transactions. To
test these hypotheses I use both two-sided t-tests and a multiple regression, the
development of which is described in the Data and Methodology section.
The importance of this research is fundamentally connected to the potential
predictive value of its results. As previously discussed, being able to more accurately
forecast the effects of M&A transactions on changes in the standard deviation of equity
returns is important because the return volatility of equity securities constitutes a key
input in several critical financial functions, such as valuing securities, pricing derivative
instruments and appropriately implementing hedging strategies (Black & Scholes 1973).
Being able to better predict the resulting return volatility of an acquirer’s equity securities
during the post-transaction completion period would allow investors to more efficiently
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organize optimal portfolios. It would also allow market participants to more accurately
price options and would allow companies and investors to better develop and implement
various hedging strategies (Engle 2002). Furthermore, understanding what systematic
factors and idiosyncratic developments influence the present value of securities allows
markets to react more quickly and accurately to novel information, increasing their
overall efficiency. Thus, quantifying and establishing the potentially significant
relationship between the diversifying nature of an M&A transaction and the resulting
change in the acquiring firm’s post-transaction completion equity return volatility could
help improve the efficiency of certain financial markets.
This research will attempt to uncover and quantify any existing, statistically
significant differences in the changes over time of the return volatility of equity securities
representing newly combined, imperfectly correlated cash flows and the return volatility
of equity securities which do not. Extensive research has been completed which focuses
on the drivers of M&A activity and M&A waves, and broad fluctuations in aggregate
M&A activity have become easier to foresee (Harford 2005; Szucs 2016). Expanding the
body of literature that is focused on better understanding the effects of M&A transactions
on the risk and value of diverse portfolios through their effects on the idiosyncratic
portion of equity return volatilities is important for investors wishing to organize optimal
portfolios, price options, and appropriately hedge risk around these transactions, as
understanding the expected level of the return volatilities of the relevant equity securities
is critical to doing so successfully (Engle 2002).
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IV.

Data and Methodology

The major steps involved in this research and analysis involved identifying three
distinct groups of firms whose historical equity return data could be used to test my
hypotheses and then calculating the equity return volatility figures necessary to do so.
The first group consisted of acquisitive firms which had completed diversifying
acquisitions. The second group consisted of acquisitive firms which had completed nondiversifying acquisitions, which I define as an acquisition in which the target and acquirer
primarily operate in the same industry. The third group consisted of firms which were
comparable to the acquisitive, diversifying firms in size and primary industry but which
had not completed an acquisition within 360 days prior to the announcement of and 540
days after the completion of the acquisitions of their acquisitive, diversifying
counterparts. This final control group consisted of firms which were paired, one-on-one,
with firms from the acquisitive, diversifying group. They were grouped first by primary
industry, then removed from each diversifying acquirer’s list of potential pairings if they
had completed an acquisition during the acquisitive, diversifying firm’s pre-transaction
announcement or post-transaction completion periods, and finally a firm was selected
from the list of remaining potential comparable firms for each acquisitive, diversifying
firm by closest market capitalization prior to the transaction announcement. Once the
firms in these three groups were identified their historical equity price data was retrieved
and the relevant equity return standard deviations for each firm in each group were
calculated over the time periods before and after the relevant M&A transactions. These
standard deviation figures were then used to test my hypotheses.
To accomplish this, I first used the Thomson SDC Platinum Mergers &
Acquisitions database to identify all M&A transactions which were announced after
13

01/01/1980 and successfully completed before 06/30/2017. I then identified all
transactions announced and completed during this period in which a company had
acquired a target firm primarily operating in a different industry than the primary
industry of the acquiring firm and filtered the dataset such that only these transactions
remained. To achieve this, I used the companies’ Standard Industrial Classification codes
(“SIC codes”) to filter each acquirer and target firm into one of 49 industry groups, which
are defined by Kenneth French and Eugene Fama (Fama and French 1997). Each of these
industry groups consists of a collection of closely related SIC codes, indicating that the
cash flows generated by firms whose SIC codes place them in the same Fama-French
industry group have similar sensitivities to economic factors. Therefore, if a firm
purchased another firm in the same Fama-French industry group I did not consider the
transaction to be diversifying and removed it from the initial dataset. I identified 980
transactions during the specified historical time period in which an acquiring firm
purchased a target firm operating in a different industry group, where the relevant
acquirer’s equity price data was available for 360 days before its acquisition
announcement and 540 days after the date its acquisition was completed, and finally
where the target firm became a wholly-owned subsidiary of the acquiring firm, or that
100% of the outstanding equity of the target firm was purchased by the acquirer. To filter
the transactions based on the availability of each acquirer’s equity price data I utilized the
Wharton Research Data Service’s Center for Research in Security Prices (“CRSP”) and
Compustat’s merged database.
I then needed to identify a group of comparable, non-acquisitive firms that could
be paired with each of the acquisitive, diversifying firms noted above. To create a set of
comparable firms to be used in significance testing I first used CRSP/Compustat’s
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merged database to identify all companies which had publicly-traded equity outstanding
at any point between 1/1/1980 and 6/30/2017. I then isolated all companies in this list
whose SIC codes placed them in the same Fama-French industry group as at least one of
the acquisitive, diversifying firms in the previously isolated transactions. I then crosschecked every company in this master set of potential comparable firms to determine
whether or not each potential comparable firm had participated in an M&A transaction
within 360 days prior to each previously identified diversifying transaction
announcement where the acquirer also primarily operated in the same Fama-French
industry group as the potential comparable firm. I also checked each potential comparable
firm for participation in an M&A transaction during the 540-day period post-transaction
completion for every previously identified diversifying transaction where the acquirer
primarily operated in the same industry group as the potential comparable firm.
I then checked every potential comparable firm against each diversifying
transaction where the acquirer primarily operated in the same industry group as the
potential comparable firm and filtered out the potential comparable firms for each
acquirer if they had participated in an M&A transaction during one of the time periods
surrounding each relevant transaction. Thus, depending on when a potential comparable
firm had participated in M&A transactions the same firm may have been considered a
potential, comparable pairing for several acquisitive, diversifying firms, a single
acquisitive, diversifying firm, or none. These filters created a unique list of potential
comparable firms for each acquisitive, diversifying firm where all potential comparable
firms for a particular acquirer had not participated in an M&A transaction within the time
periods described above surrounding the relevant transaction dates and all of which
operated in the same industry as the diversifying acquirer.
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If equity price data was not available for a potential comparable firm for at least
360 days prior to a relevant transaction announcement and 540 days after the same
transaction became effective it was removed from the set of potential comparable firms
for that particular acquirer. I then paired each of the acquisitive, diversifying firms with
one, non-acquisitive control firm from the previously filtered lists to better control in my
significance tests and multiple regression analysis for inherent differences in the
sensitivities of the equity return volatilities of firms with certain market capitalizations,
operating in certain industries, and during the specific time periods under observation to
various economic factors. I matched each acquisitive, diversifying firm with a comparable
firm from the previously constructed lists of potential comparable firms by closest market
capitalization, calculated as of one month before the time of the relevant transaction
announcement. This timing decision for the data to be used in the market capitalization
calculations was intended to minimize the effects of each transaction announcement on
the market prices of the equity securities of the acquirers and potential comparable firms.
The final dataset consisted of 980 pairs of acquisitive, diversifying firms and nonacquisitive control firms, matched by primary industry of operation and market
capitalization, and where the comparable, paired control firms had not participated in an
M&A transaction within the windows described previously surrounding their paired
counterparts’ transaction announcements and completions. The daily equity return
standard deviations of these firms were used in various t-tests and the multiple regression
developed in this research, the results of which may be found in Appendix tables 1-6, 8,
and 9.
I also used the Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum database and the
CRSP/Compustat merged database to identify all transactions in which a firm
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successfully completed a non-diversifying acquisition (one in which the acquirer and
target primarily operated in the same Fama-French industry group) and which were
announced after 01/01/1980 and successfully completed before 06/30/2017. This is the
same time period during which the initial set of transactions involving acquisitive,
diversifying firms were identified. I then filtered this list of acquisitive, non-diversifying
firms based on whether each acquirer’s equity price data was available for the 360-day
period prior to each relevant acquisition announcement and the 540-day period after the
dates of the same transactions’ completions, and whether or not the target firm became a
wholly owned subsidiary of the acquirer. If any transaction or acquirer did not meet these
requirements the transaction was removed from the initial set of non-diversifying
transactions. 9256 transactions which met these requirements during this historical
period and each acquirer were identified. This group of acquisitive, non-diversifying
acquirers was used in several two-sample t-tests and a final paired t-test to discover if
significant differences exist in the changes in equity return volatilities between companies
which have merged based on whether the transaction was diversifying in nature. The
results of these significance tests are discussed in the Results section of this paper and can
be found in Appendix tables 5-7.
Next, I acquired all available daily equity security price data for each of the
companies in the acquisitive, diversifying group, the acquisitive, non-diversifying group,
and the non-acquisitive control group for the historical period between 01/01/1979 and
12/31/2018 and calculated each equity security’s percentage change in price between
each trading day for 360 days prior to each relevant transaction’s announcement and 540
days after the same transaction’s completion date. This equity price information was
pulled from the CRSP/Compustat merged database. I then calculated the daily, monthly,
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and yearly standard deviations of the percentage changes in price (the returns) of the
equity securities of each acquisitive, diversifying firm, each acquisitive, non-diversifying
firm, and each non-acquisitive control firm during the 360-day period preceding each
relevant transaction announcement and for the 540 days following the date each relevant
transaction became effective. This yielded a daily standard deviation of returns for every
equity security in each of the aforementioned groups during both the relevant pretransaction announcement period and the same transaction’s post completion period.
These ‘before and after’ standard deviations of the equity returns of each acquisitive,
diversifying firm and non-acquisitive control firm were the volatility figures utilized in
my significance tests.
Following this I calculated the daily equity return standard deviations of each firm
in each of the groups for every monthly period during the 540-day period following each
relevant transaction completion date. I also calculated the percentage of each firm’s pretransaction announcement equity return volatility that the daily standard deviations of
the same firm’s equity returns observed during each monthly, post-transaction
completion period represented. The results of these calculations can be found in Appendix
tables 10-12 and are represented visually across time in Appendix figure 1. Patterns in
the development of the mean daily equity return standard deviation of each of the
aforementioned groups over the monthly post-transaction completion periods are
discussed further in the Results section of this paper.
Finally, I calculated the changes in the mean daily equity return standard
deviations of both the group of acquisitive, diversifying firms and the non-acquisitive
control firms from the pre-transaction announcement to post-transaction completion
periods, as well as the differences of the differences between the two groups across the
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same periods and during each monthly period following the dates the transactions became
effective. All calculations involving historical equity price data required that I first clean
the data received from the CRSP/Compustat database. Some prices pulled from this
database were listed as negative values and had to be changed to their absolute values.
Where daily equity price data was missing on days where financial markets were open, I
assumed that the data moved in a linear fashion from the last available price to the next
available price and linearly interpolated the values in the missing spaces. Therefore, some
of the calculated equity return volatility figures in this research may represent slightly
different figures than were actually observed in the market. Few gaps were identified
which spanned more than 1-2 trading days, indicating that the CRSP/Compustat merged
database’s equity price data was relatively clean and complete and that my assumption to
linearly interpolate where it was found to be missing should not significantly affect the
results of this research. These data cleaning measures and the calculations of the relevant
equity return standard deviations described above were primarily executed
programmatically using proprietary algorithms I developed through Microsoft’s Visual
Basic Application package in Microsoft Excel.
After calculating the daily return standard deviations of the equity securities of
each firm in each of the three aforementioned groups during the periods described above,
I then regressed the daily return standard deviations of both the acquisitive, diversifying
firms’ equities and non-acquisitive control group’s equities observed during both pretransaction announcement and post-transaction completion periods. I regressed these
volatility figures against several significant factors which are known to affect the
volatility of equity returns. I utilized Microsoft Excel’s Data Analysis programs package
to run this regression. The selected factors and their sources are discussed here:
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Multiple Regression Factor Selection and Data Sources
a)

It has been shown that the market value of a firm affects the volatility of the
returns of its equity securities (Cheung & Ng 1992). It has been shown that, while
controlling for other factors affecting a firm’s equity return volatility, as a firm’s
market value of equity increases the overall return volatility of that same equity
decreases. To control for this factor, the market capitalization of each firm, both
from the acquisitive, diversifying group and non-acquisitive control group, was
calculated as of one month prior to the date of the paired firms’ applicable
transaction announcements. For each pairing, this was the date of the acquisitive,
diversifying firm’s transaction announcement. I then calculated the natural log of
each firm’s market capitalization on this date and utilized these figures in my
regression. The data for these calculations, including the share price and number
of common shares of stock outstanding for each firm, were accessed from
CRSP/Compustat’s merged database. This factor is labeled “ln(Firm Market
Capitalization)” in the regression results included in Appendix table 9.

b)

It has been shown that different levels of current and expected inflation
significantly affect the volatility of equity security returns (Valcarcel 2012). To
control for changes in the level of realized inflation over time I utilized
information on the Consumer Price Index (“CPI”), which I accessed from Kenneth
French’s website, to approximate the value of the inflation factor within the
United States associated with the time periods during which the standard
deviations of equity returns were observed. Approximate percent changes in the
CPI for the calendar year prior to the date of each transaction announcement and
the calendar year prior to the date each transaction became effective were used.
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These percentage changes in the CPI were matched in the multiple regression
with the daily standard deviation of equity returns observed during the time
periods surrounding the relevant transaction dates. This factor is labeled
“Inflation” in the regression results included in Appendix table 9.
c)

It is known that the general volatility level of a securities market is a significant
factor affecting the conditional, expected return volatilities of individual securities
traded in the market (Smith 1989). To control for this systematic factor, I
calculated the daily standard deviations of percentage changes in the level of the
S&P 500 index for the same periods I calculated each firm’s equity return volatility
during, namely, 360 days before every transaction announcement and 540 days
after every transaction completion date. I derived these figures using data from
CRSP/Compustat’s merged database and included these values in my regression,
pairing each equity return standard deviation with the standard deviation of daily
S&P 500 returns observed during the same historical time period that the paired
equity return volatility was observed. This factor is labeled “Market Volatility
During Period” in the regression results included in Appendix table 9.

d)

It is known that a firm’s equity return volatility is significantly influenced by the
age of the firm (Khan et al. 2016). The standard deviations of returns of equity
securities representing ownership in older, more well-established firms tend to be
smaller than the average levels of equity return volatility observed among
younger firms. To control for this age factor, I first found the earliest date that
each firm had floated equity securities to the public, and then, for each firm,
subtracted this date from the date the relevant transaction was announced. These
calculations were possible because the dates were stored as serial numbers, where
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each additional day across a period of time increased the serial number
representing that particular date by 1. Thus, I was able to divide these timedifference figures by 365 to give an age approximation (in calendar years) for each
acquisitive, diversifying firm and each non-acquisitive control firm at the time of
the relevant transaction announcement for each pairing. Data for these
calculations was also accessed from the CRSP/Compustst database. This factor is
labeled “Age of Firm” in the regression results included in Appendix table 9.
e)

Several dummy variables were also included in the multiple regression. The first
dummy variable accounts for the time period during which each daily standard
deviation of equity returns was observed during, relative to the relevant
transaction dates. This variable assumes a value of 0 if the standard deviation was
observed during a pre-transaction announcement period and a 1 if it was observed
during a post-transaction completion period. This factor is labeled “PostCompletion” in the regression results included in Appendix table 9. The second
dummy variable accounts for whether each observed daily equity return standard
deviation was calculated from the returns of a non-acquisitive control firm or an
acquisitive, diversifying firm. This variable assumes a value of 0 if the equity
security under observation was associated with a non-acquisitive control firm and
assumes a value of 1 if it was associated with an acquisitive, diversifying firm. This
factor is labeled “Acquisition” in the regression results included in Appendix table
9.
Finally, I included a dummy variable which accounted for any potential
interaction between these two factors. This value of this variable for each observed
equity return standard deviation was calculated as the product of the previous two
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dummy variables’ values for the same equity return volatility figure. Therefore,
all values of this factor in the multiple regression assume a value of 0 except for
those where the calculated daily return standard deviations are of equity securities
associated with acquisitive, diversifying firms and are observed during the 540day periods after these firms had completed their diversifying acquisitions. For
equity return standard deviations with these characteristics, this final dummy
variable assumes a value of 1. The regression coefficient and corresponding
confidence interval of this final dummy variable were intended to show whether
the null hypothesis could or could not be rejected with an α of .05, as this factor
quantifies the isolated effects of the interaction between the passage of time and
the diversifying nature of certain M&A transactions on changes in the equity
return volatilities of diversifying acquirers. This factor is labeled “Acquisition *
Post-Completion” in the regression results included in Appendix table 9.
Again, the coefficient value and 95% confidence interval associated with
this interaction variable are intended to provide statistical evidence supporting
the rejection of or failure to reject the null hypothesis, which is that no significant
difference in the changes of acquisitive firms’ observed equity return volatilities
from the pre-transaction announcement to post-transaction completion periods
will be observed, while controlling for the factors described above, based on
whether or not the transactions are diversifying in nature. If the coefficient of this
interaction variable is found to be negative and statistically significant, however,
then the interaction between the diversifying nature of certain M&A transactions
and the passage of time from the pre-transaction announcement to posttransaction completion periods surrounding the same transactions will be shown
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to lower the mean daily standard deviation of the diversifying acquirers’ equity
returns, and this finding would support my hypothesis.

It is crucial to note that these are not the only systematic and idiosyncratic factors
which have significant effects on the volatilities of equity returns. Other important factors
were considered for use in the multiple regression but were purposefully not included,
primarily due to a lack of accurate, readily-available data. Discussion treating the choice
to omit several of these significant factors, as well as what could potentially be done to
control for them in future research, is included in the Conclusions and Discussion section
of this paper.

V.

Significance Testing
While distributions of the standard deviations of returns for groups of equity

securities are typically highly skewed, the differences between the daily standard
deviations of the observed equity security returns from all three isolated groups of firms
across time periods and between the paired groups of acquisitive, diversifying firms and
non-acquisitive control firms were found to be approximately normally distributed
(Andersen et al. 2001). Therefore, to test the significance of the observed changes in the
mean daily equity return standard deviations of the three groups of firms included in this
research across time periods and between each group during similar time periods I
utilized several paired and two-sample t-tests, the results of which may be found in the
first section of the attached Appendix. I used paired t-tests to analyze the significance of
the differences between the mean standard deviations of the equity returns of the
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acquisitive, diversifying firms and the non-acquisitive control firms during each pretransaction announcement and post-transaction completion period, as well as the
differences between the same groups’ mean daily standard deviations of equity returns
from the pre-transaction announcement to post-transaction completion periods. I also
used a paired t-test to discover whether a significant difference exists between the mean
standard deviations of equity returns of the acquisitive, non-diversifying firms across the
same periods relative to their transactions.
I then used two, two-sample t-tests to examine the significance of the differences
between the mean daily standard deviations of the equity returns of the acquisitive,
diversifying firms and the acquisitive, non-diversifying firms during both the pretransaction announcement and post-transaction completion periods. The variances of the
distributions of the acquisitive, diversifying firms’ daily standard deviations of equity
returns and the acquisitive, non-diversifying firms’ equity return standard deviations
were assumed to be unequal in these two-sample t-tests, as the ratio of the standard
deviations of the two distributions of daily standard deviations of equity returns was
greater than 2 (where either s1/s2 or s2/s1 > 2). The results of these significance tests are
included in the first Appendix section and discussed further in the Results section.
To test the significance of the diversifying nature of certain mergers and
acquisitions as a factor influencing changes in the daily standard deviations of the equity
returns of acquisitive firms acros the periods surrounding M&A transactions while
simultaneously attempting to control for other factors which are known to significantly
affect equity return volatilities (discussed in the Data and Methodology section), I
developed the following multiple regression:
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𝜎𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 (ln(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)) + 𝛽2 (𝐴𝑔𝑒 𝑂𝑓 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚) + 𝛽3 (𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) +
𝛽4 (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑) + 𝛽5 (𝐷(𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) ) + 𝛽6 (𝐷(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) ) +
𝛽7 (𝐷(𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗

𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) )

+ 𝜀𝑖

where σi is the observed daily standard deviation of the historical returns of a firm’s
publicly-traded equity securities, α is the intercept coefficient, “ln(Firm Market
Capitalization)” is the natural log of the market capitalization of the firm one month prior
to the relevant transaction announcement date, “Age Of Firm” is the number of calendar
years where the common stock of the firm had been publicly traded prior to the relevant
transaction announcement date, “Inflation” is the realized change in the CPI for the
calendar year prior to the start of the period during which the equity return standard
deviation was observed during, and “Market Volatility During Period” is the daily
standard deviation of the S&P 500 index returns observed during the same time period
over which the equity return volatility was observed. “DPost-Completion” is a dummy variable
which assumes a value of either 1 or 0 and indicates whether the standard deviation of
equity returns was observed during a 360-day pre-transaction announcement period or a
540-day post-transaction completion period, “DAcquisition” is also a dummy variable which
indicates whether or not the firm under observation was involved in an acquisition or was
a non-acquisitive control firm, and “DAcquisition * Post-Completion” is a final dummy variable
which accounts for the potential interaction effects between whether or not the firm was
involved in a diversifying acquisition and the time period relative to the transaction
during which the equity return volatility was observed. Finally, i represents residuals in
the observed daily standard deviations of equity returns that are not explicitly forecasted
by the factors included in the multiple regression.
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In total, 3920 daily equity return standard deviations were included in the
regression, which was the number of standard deviation figures for each acquisitive,
diversifying firm and each non-acquisitive control firm, calculated during both the
relevant pre-transaction announcement and post-transaction completion periods for the
pairing each firm belonged to (980 pairs of firms * 2 firms per pair * 2 equity return
standard deviations per firm). Each of these daily equity return standard deviations were
regressed against the factor values unique to the time periods during which the equity
volatilities were observed, and the results of this multiple regression are given in
Appendix tables 8 and 9.
I did not include a factor controlling for the different industries each pair of firms
primarily operated in because this factor was adequately controlled for when selecting a
comparable, non-acquisitive control firm to pair with each acquisitive, diversifying firm.
As mentioned previously, one of the constraints involved in selecting the potential control
firms to be paired with each acquisitive, diversifying firm was that the control firms must
have primarily operated in the same industry as the acquisitive, diversifying firm they
were to potentially be paired with. Blocking the selected pairs of acquisitive, diversifying
firms and non-acquisitive control firms by the industry in which they primarily operated
allowed the use of paired t-tests, and should effectively control for inherent, industryspecific differences in firms’ sensitivities to economic factors affecting equity return
volatilities not explicitly controlled for in my regression.
Differences in firms’ sensitivities to economic factors affecting equity return
volatilities across different periods of time were controlled for by blocking the pairs of
firms further by selecting control firms which had not participated in an M&A transaction
during the 360-day pre-transaction announcement or 540-day post-transaction
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completion periods surrounding the diversifying transactions undertaken by the firms
they were paired with. The control firms also must have been publicly traded during these
time periods. Controlling for any inherent differences in sensitivity to factors affecting
equity return volatilities between firms with differing market capitalization values
required blocking the firms even further, and this was achieved in a final step by matching
each acquisitive, diversifying firm with a non-acquisitive control firm operating in the
same industry by closest market capitalization value as of one month prior to the
acquisitive firm’s acquisition announcement. Blocking the pairs of firms in this way
effectively strengthened the results of the regression by mitigating the effects of
differences in firm’s sensitivities to these economic factors (time period, primary industry
and size) on the outcome of the multiple regression.

VI.

Results

The differences in the observed mean standard deviations of equity returns
included in the paired t-tests were found to be significant for the acquisitive, diversifying
group across time periods and between both the acquisitive, diversifying group and the
non-acquisitive control group in the pre-transaction announcement and post-transaction
completion periods (see Appendix tables 1, 3 and 4). Significant results from these t-tests
indicate that differences between the mean equity return standard deviations of the
groups involved were greater than 0 with an α of .05, or a 95% level of confidence. The
differences in the mean equity return volatilities included in the paired t-tests between
the non-diversifying control group across time periods and the acquisitive, nondiversifying group across time periods were both found to be insignificant with a 95%
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level of confidence (see Appendix tables 2 and 7). The results of both two-sample t-tests
were insignificant, indicating that no statistically significant difference was observed
between the mean daily standard deviations of the equity returns of the two acquisitive
groups during either the pre-transaction announcement or post-transaction completion
periods (see Appendix tables 5 and 6). All of the t-tests performed, both paired and twosample, were two-sided in nature.
The results of the multiple regression developed in the previous section indicate
that there is a statistically significant, negative relationship between whether a firm
completes a diversifying acquisition and the resulting change in the firm’s equity return
volatility from the pre-transaction announcement to post-transaction completion period
(see Appendix tables 8 and 9). The multiple regression coefficient for this interaction
factor was found to be negative with a 95% level of confidence, which allows a rejection
of the null hypothesis that no significant relationship exists between changes in acquirers’
equity return volatility and whether or not the acquisitions they engage in are
diversifying in nature.
The coefficient of the interaction factor was found to be -.0025, which is smaller,
in absolute value terms, than the coefficients of the factors controlling for market
volatility and inflation during each period, as well as the factor controlling for whether
each firm completed an acquisition. The absolute value of the interaction factor coefficient
was larger than the coefficients of the factors controlling for the market capitalization of
each firm, the time period relative to the relevant transaction that each equity return
volatility was observed during, and the length of time during which the firm had been
publicly traded at the time of the relevant acquisition announcement.
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The magnitude of the interaction coefficient equates to a roughly 3.9% larger
annualized decrease in the mean equity return volatility of firms which completed
diversifying transactions when compared to the mean change in the equity return
volatilities of those firms which had not participated in M&A transactions over the same
time periods. In other words, the acquisitive, diversifying firms’ mean daily standard
deviation of equity returns during the post-transaction completion period was roughly
equal to 96.1% of the same firm’s pre-transaction announcement mean daily standard
deviation if the effects of the interaction factor, accounting for the diversifying nature of
the transactions and the passage of time, were isolated. This finding supports the
expectations of the hypothesis put forward in this paper. All other factors selected for
inclusion in the multiple regression were also found to be significant with a 95% level of
confidence. The coefficients of all the multiple regression factors except for the factor
controlling for the observed market volatility during each period were found to be
negative, and these coefficient signs conform with expectations previously established in
the literature (Schwert 1989; Valcarcel 2012; Bessembinder & Zhang 2013; Khan et al.
2016). The results of the multiple regression, including each factor coefficient and the
associated 95% confidence intervals, are included in Appendix tables 8 and 9.
The monthly, mean, post-transaction completion equity return volatility of each
group of firms, expressed as a percentage of the pre-transaction announcement period
equity return volatility of the same group, are included in Appendix tables 10, 11, and 12.
As the number of months post-transaction completion increases, the mean daily standard
deviation of the equity returns of both groups of acquisitive firms decreases significantly.
This is evidenced by the paired t-tests measuring the differences in the mean equity return
volatility between the two acquisitive groups across the time periods surrounding the
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isolated transactions. As can be seen from the results of the paired t-test for the nonacquisitive control group across time periods, there was no significant change in the mean
daily standard deviation of equity returns for these firms across the time periods
surrounding the transactions of the acquisitive firms they were paired with. I have
included a visualization of the mean equity return standard deviation for each group,
expressed as a percentage of the same group’s pre-transaction announcement mean equity
return standard deviation value, for each monthly period during the 540-day posttransaction completion period in Appendix figure 1.

VII. Conclusions and Discussion
The conclusions that can be drawn from these results are several. The significant,
negative factor coefficient representing the effects of a firm completing a diversifying
acquisition on the changes in the firm’s equity return volatility over time supports my
hypothesis. This finding also supports the idea that, on average, capital market
participants react to new information affecting the pricing of securities representing
ownership in newly combined, diversified firms in such a way that accounts for the lower
level of correlation among the cash flows to be generated by the firms and the differing
sensitivities of these cash flows to changes in economic factors. Thus, this research
demonstrates that just as idiosyncratic developments affecting the returns of a single
security have muted effects on the overall returns of a well-diversified portfolio, changes
in economic factors or other developments which uniquely affect investors’ estimations
regarding the cash-flows to be generated by the underlying businesses of diversified firms
have muted effects on the volatility of the equity returns of these same firms.
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That all factors included in the multiple regression were found to have significant
effects on the observed changes in equity return volatilities but the resulting R2 value was
only ~15% suggests not only that other significant factors which influence changes in the
return volatilities of equity securities during periods surrounding M&A transactions
could potentially be identified and controlled for in future research, but also that the
majority of the factors influencing a given change in an acquirer’s equity return volatility
around the time of an acquisition are situationally specific and driven primarily by
idiosyncratic developments. Several other potentially significant factors which could be
controlled for in future research are the number of diverse, preexisting business segments
that an acquirer operates prior to completing an acquisition, the amount of debt an
acquirer may take on to finance a transaction, the change in the capital structure of the
surviving firm during the transaction, and the historical covariance between the returns
of equity securities of firms operating in the acquirer’s primary industry group and the
primary industry group of the target firm. The potential effects of these factors on
changes in the equity return volatilities of acquisitive firms and the reasons for their
omission from the multiple regression developed in this research are discussed further in
this section.
The SIC codes that I used to filter the companies into their respective FamaFrench industry groups are assigned only based on the primary industry in which each
firm operates. If a diversifying acquirer operates multiple business units in several
different industries, the firm already enjoys some measure of cash-flow diversification
when it acquires yet another company that primarily operates in a different industry
group than itself. The single SIC code assigned to the acquiring firm may not accurately
account for this, and the effects of further diversification on the return volatility of this
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acquirer’s equity securities may be less significant than the effects of an initial,
diversifying acquisition on the equity return volatility of a firm which only operates in a
single industry prior to completing this transaction.
Readily-available anecdotal evidence accentuates the potentially significant effects
that an acquirer’s pre-existing level of diversification, and the degree to which an
acquisition further diversifies an acquirer’s underlying cash flows, may have on changes
in the equity return volatility of the acquirer. For example, one of the acquisitions which
was observed in this research was the acquisition of DII Industries, LLC by Halliburton
Co., for $8.13b USD in an all-stock transaction. The transaction was announced on
02/26/1998 and completed on 09/30/1998. Haliburton’s 1997 10-K describes two
business segments extant at the time of the acquisition announcement: The Energy
Group (including Haliburton Energy Services), which was primarily engaged in the sale
of various specialized pieces of upstream drilling equipment and their maintenance, and
the Engineering and Construction group, whose primary services included designing,
engineering, and managing the constriction of physical mining and drilling assets for
upstream oil and gas firms. Although the two firms involved in this transaction operated
in similar industries, DII Industries allowed Haliburton to gain a significant degree of
exposure to the midstream oil and gas servicing and products manufacturing markets
which they had not previously enjoyed and was therefore considered a diversifying
transaction. The acquisition was completed without major incident (Bloomberg 2019).
Interestingly, Haliburton’s daily equity return standard deviation during the 540day post-transaction completion period, expressed as a percentage of pre-transaction
announcement daily equity return volatility, was roughly 4% higher than expected given
the results of the multiple regression developed in this research and the factor levels
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observed during the time periods surrounding the transaction. To be clear, this residual
value indicates that Haliburton’s resulting equity return standard deviation during this
post-transaction completion period was 104% of the conditional, expected daily standard
deviation value predicted by the multiple regression developed in this this research and
the factor values present at the time. The fact that the acquisition target operated in an
industry whose mean equity returns covary positively with those of the industry in which
Haliburton operates and that Haliburton was already somewhat diversified (operating
multiple, distinct business segments) may help explain why Haliburton’s observed level
of post-transaction completion equity return volatility was greater than expected given
the levels of the regression factors observed at the time.
Given that the equity securities of diversified companies have been found to
consistently trade at premium valuation multiples relative to their non-diversified peers,
quantifying and controlling for the level of an acquirer’s pre-existing diversification and
the degree to which an acquisition further diversifies the cash flows generated by the
combined entity’s business segments could provide results with important applications
for corporate valuation (Villalonga 2004). While I considered using the number of
previously existing business segments as a proxy for each firm’s pre-transaction
announcement level of diversification, the available dataset from the CRSP/Compustat
merged database was unfortunately not robust enough to provide regression values for
the majority of the firms under observation. Future research could control for this factor
if better information regarding historical number of business segments operated by each
of the firms included in this research can be procured, or if another robust proxy measure
for the level of a firm’s underlying cash-flow diversification could be developed.
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Similarly, the covariance between the historical equity returns of firms which
operate in different industries may affect the degree to which an M&A transaction
between firms operating in these industries affects the resulting return standard deviation
of the equity securities representing ownership of the surviving firm. If the mean equity
returns of firms operating in one industry covary positively with the mean equity returns
of firms operating in another industry, the diversifying effects of an M&A transaction
between firms operating in these industries may have a less significant effect on changes
in the equity return volatility of the surviving entity than if the transaction involved firms
operating in industries whose mean equity return covariance, relative to each other, were
negative.
In the example given earlier, Halliburton purchased a company which primarily
operated in an industry whose mean equity returns covary positively with the mean
equity returns of the industry in which Haliburton primarily operates (upstream oil and
gas servicing and construction). This positive covariance may have lessened the effects of
this diversifying transaction on the change in Haliburton’s equity return volatility from
the pre-transaction announcement to post-transaction completion periods. If an accurate
measure of the covariances between the mean, historical equity returns of each of the 49
Fama-French industry groups could be derived, these values could serve as a factor which
could help control for the degree to which a transaction increases the level of
diversification among the newly combined business segments of an acquisitive firm. The
inclusion of such a factor would likely make the multiple regression developed in this
research more robust.
It has also been shown that management’s choice of capital structure (the mixture
of debt and equity used to finance the firm’s assets and operations) influences the volatility
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of the firm’s equity returns. Typically, the higher the level of a firm’s debt/equity ratio,
the higher the firm’s equity return volatility (Black 1976; Cheung & Ng 1992; Choi &
Richardson 2016; Aharon & Yagil 2019). This phenomenon is known as the “leverage
effect”. Further, it has been shown that previous levels of equity return volatility
significantly influence future conditional return volatilities (Cheung & Ng 1992).
Therefore, future research could attempt to control for the changes in the capital
structure and leverage levels of acquisitive firms which occur during many M&A
transactions and may serve to increase sustained levels of observed equity return
volatility across time. Controlling for this factor would also improve the multiple
regression model developed in this research.
Anecdotal evidence underlining the potential significance of a firm’s capital
structure and leverage ratios as factors influencing the firm’s equity return volatility is
also abundant. The acquisition of Space Systems/Loral Inc. (“SS/L”) by Maxar
Technologies illustrates the significant force the leverage effect exerts on the return
volatilities of equity securities. Maxar Technologies is a diversified space technology
company which is primarily engaged in the manufacturing, marketing, sale, and servicing
of communication, observation, GPS, and equipment servicing satellites (Bloomberg
2019). The purchase of SS/L represented the firm’s first major foray into the
telecommunications industry and was therefore considered a diversifying transaction.
The transaction was announced on 06/26/2012 and was completed without major
incident on 11/02/2012. Maxar Technologies financed the roughly ~$1b USD
transaction through a term loan ($250m), an asset-backed notes issuance ($600m), and
cash from its reserves, significantly increasing the debt load of the company and its
leverage levels (Bloomberg 2019).
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Because Maxar Technologies chose to finance this relatively large transaction
primarily through the use of debt, the value of the firm’s total debt to total equity ratio
increased by no less than 413% over the course of this transaction, while the firm’s total
debt to total asset ratio increased by 166% during the same period (Bloomberg 2019). The
firm’s daily equity return standard deviation also increased significantly from the pretransaction announcement to post-transaction completion periods, with the daily
standard deviation of equity returns becoming almost 114% larger during the posttransaction completion period than pre-transaction announcement levels. This is a
significantly larger increase (i = ~19%) in equity return volatility than would have been
expected given the multiple regression developed in this research and the factor values
extant during the respective time periods surrounding the transaction. It is not
unreasonable to assume that this inflated change in equity return volatility was largely
driven by the assumption of relatively large amounts of debt by the Maxar Technologies
and the resulting significant increases in the firm’s leverage ratios. The leverage effect
and changes in acquirers’ leverage ratios were not controlled for in this research primarily
due to a lack of available data regarding the values of firms’ assets and debt, especially in
the decades included in this research before financial reporting requirements became
generally more rigorous. Future research could be performed which controls for the
effects of debt firms take on to finance acquisitions on their resulting equity return
volatility if adequate data regarding the market values of the debt securities and assets of
the firms included in this research can be procured.
Another important factor that was not controlled for by the multiple regression
developed in this research is connected to the leverage factor discussed above. It is
important to note the two main factors which influence the idiosyncratic portion of the
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variance of the equity returns of a given firm: management’s choice of capital structure
and the volatility of the cash flows generated by the underlying assets (Choi & Richardson
2016). These two factors work in tandem to influence the idiosyncratic volatility of a
given firm’s equity returns, while systematic factors (such as several of those controlled
for in the multiple regression discussed previously) determine of the remainder the
volatility of the firm’s equity returns. It is also important to note that mergers and
acquisitions transactions are not undertaken by firms solely for the purpose of
diversification. Diversification can be achieved independently by investors at little to no
marginal cost, and, all else being equal, the merging of any two publicly-traded companies
marginally decreases the total value available to investors because it takes away the choice
these investors previously had of investing in either one of the now-merged firms or the
combination of such. For this reason, among others, an acquisition must be synergistic,
not simply diversifying, if shareholders are to support it. Thus, the newly combined firms
must also be expected to generate synergies for the acquiring firm’s management to
justify the premiums typically paid for control of a target firm.
In completing any transaction, management will attempt to select a financing mix
that will maximize the value of the synergies expected to be realized in the resulting
levered free cash flows of the combined entity. These are the cash flows which primarily
drive the value of a firm’s equity securities. In many instances, this financing optimization
effort involves the use of debt. Debt is attractive as a financing instrument because the
cost of debt to an acquirer is typically lower than the cost of equity due to their relative
positions in the capital structure and debt’s corresponding priority in terms of claims on
cash flows generated by the liquidation of a firm’s assets in the event of a bankruptcy.
Firm management may also decide to finance an acquisition by issuing stock if they feel
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that this would maximize firm value. If a transaction is financed solely by equity and a
premium is paid, the leverage ratios of the acquirer will decrease, potentially lowering the
volatility of the combined firm’s equity returns. However, regardless of management’s
choices regarding the composition of the transaction financing mix, the resulting,
combined entity’s capital structure will likely be different that the original capital
structure of the acquirer, and the combined volatility of the cash flows generated by the
underlying assets of the newly merged entity will differ from the volatilities of the cash
flows generated by the separate assets prior to the transaction.
This change in the capital structure of the surviving entity has substantial effects
on the resulting equity return standard deviation of the acquirer post-transaction
completion. For instance, if a firm pays a premium to acquire another firm in a stock-forstock transaction, then the resulting lower debt-equity ratio may decrease the equity
return volatility of the acquiring firm, but the opposite may be true if the transaction is
financed primarily by debt. In the long-run, management teams will attempt to steer
firms’ capital structures towards optimal mixtures of debt and equity, but as acquirers’
capital structures and leverage ratios change over the course of mergers and acquisitions
the resulting post-transaction completion equity return volatilities of these acquirers are
significantly influenced by these changes (Baker & Wurgler 2002; Leary & Roberts 2005;
Bessembinder & Zhang 2013; Choi & Richardson 2016).
Hence there exists a potentially significant confounding issue between the
leverage effect and the results of my multiple regression. There are essentially only two
possible changes which may occur to a firm’s capital structure between the pretransaction announcement and post-transaction completion periods; Leverage ratios will
either increase or decrease depending on management’s choice of financing for the
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transaction. The chance that the transaction financing mix is such that the acquirer’s
leverage ratios remain completely unchanged post-transaction completion is so small that
it may be reasonably dismissed as a possibility. Even if this were somehow achieved, the
volatility of the new, underlying combination of cash-flow generating assets would still
interact differently with the capital structure to uniquely affect the volatility of the
surviving firm’s equity returns.
Therefore, because the level of a firm’s leverage is positively correlated with the
daily standard deviation of the firm’s equity returns, if the majority of the acquisitive firms
included in this research financed their transactions in such a way as to increase their
leverage ratios, this should serve to increase the mean daily equity return standard
deviations of these groups from the pre-transaction announcement to post-transaction
completion periods, all else being equal. If this were the case, the fact that a significant,
negative relationship between the diversifying nature of certain M&A transactions and
the resulting equity return volatilities of the acquirers was still discovered while not
controlling for changes in the acquisitive firm’s capital structures would serve to
unambiguously strengthen the conclusions of this research. However, if the opposite were
true and a majority of the acquisitive firms in this research financed their acquisitions
primarily with equity, leverage ratios would decrease on average, which would work to
decrease the mean daily standard deviation of the acquisitive firms’ equity returns posttransaction completion. If this were the case, because the changes in the acquirers’ capital
structures from the pre-transaction announcement to post-transaction completion
periods are not controlled for in my multiple regression the effects of this factor would be
confounded with the hypothesized volatility-decreasing effects of the diversifying nature
of the M&A transactions undertaken by these firms.
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Therefore, in order to truly make the equity return volatility of an acquirer
comparable between the pre-transaction announcement and post-transaction completion
periods, one would need to control for how changes in the acquirer’s capital structure
interact with the new combination of underlying assets to influence the idiosyncratic
portion of the return volatility of the equities representing ownership in the newly
combined entity. Said differently, one would need to control for changes in acquirers’
capital structures and leverage ratios that occur throughout each transaction, not simply
the amount of debt potentially taken on to finance the acquisitions. To make the
differences in the acquisitive firms’ equity return volatilities comparable across time
periods and further isolate the diversifying effects of certain transactions on equity return
volatility levels, a factor would need to be introduced which would control for the change
in capital structure attributable to management’s choice of financing for each transaction
and the resulting variance of the new portfolio of cash-flow-generating assets (the newly
combined firm). However, the development of such a flexible, robust factor is complicated
by the fact that the relationship between a firm’s level of equity return volatility, leverage
ratios, and underlying asset volatility is concave, non-linear, and asymmetric. At
relatively low levels of leverage, the assumption of additional leverage by a firm generally
serves to decrease the equity return volatility of the firm, but at relatively high levels of
leverage the assumption of additional debt increases a firm’s equity return volatility
exponentially (Nelson 1991; Choi & Richardson 2016).
If a variable could be developed which is highly correlated with how a change in
a acquirer’s capital structure interacts with the volatility of the underlying assets to affect
the volatility of the firm’s levered free cash flows (and thus the volatility of the equity
returns) between the pre-transaction announcement to post-transaction completion
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periods, then this factor could be effectively controlled for. This factor was not controlled
for in this research primarily due to a lack of available data which could be used to identify
the changes in the capital structure of the acquiring firms included in my significance
tests. A variable which was tenable and robust and which could effectively control for this
factor was also difficult to identify and develop with such little data. The identification
and testing of different proxy variables that could be used to control for this factor could
be undertaken by future researchers and could provide a valuable improvement to the
quality and accuracy of the multiple regression developed in this research.
A final uncontrolled yet recognized factor which significantly affects an acquisitive
firm’s post-transaction completion equity return volatility is the relative market
capitalization of the target firm to that of the acquirer. In the case of this research, it is
not unreasonable to assume that the size of the target firm’s market capitalization relative
to the market capitalization of the acquirer pre-transaction announcement may be
positively correlated to the degree to which the acquisition further diversifies the
economic sensitivities of the cash flows to be generated by the surviving entity, although
this has not been treated directly in the literature. However, it has been demonstrated
that, in the case of portfolios of securities, progressively larger tilts towards a particular
security cause the portfolio to be increasingly affected by the characteristics of the
security (Markowitz 1952; Engle 2002). This would imply that larger, diverse target
firms should, on average, have a greater diversifying effect on their acquirers’ cash flows.
For instance, assume one firm acquires another firm whose market capitalization
is equivalent to 1% of the acquiring firm’s pre-transaction announcement market
capitalization, and another firm acquires a firm whose market capitalization is the same
as the second acquirer’s market capitalization pre-transaction announcement. If one
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assumes that both transactions are diversifying in nature and all other significant factors
are held constant, the second transaction should have a more significant effect on the
extent to which the acquirer is diversified post-transaction completion because the
relative size of the target to the acquirer is much larger than in the first hypothetical
transaction. Although this relative size factor was not controlled for in the regression
developed in this research, the fact that significant results supporting my hypothesis were
still discovered in spite of the fact that many of the target companies were relatively small
when compared with their acquirers serves to strengthen the case for the results of my
significance testing. Future research could control for this relative size factor to
strengthen the results of this research.
A note should also be made that no distinction was made between different share
classes that some of the firms under observation may have issued prior to the transactions
isolated for use in this research. Firms may issue different classes of shares with unique
rights and voting privileges, and the prices of each of these share classes may react
differently to new information. Because of this, the return volatility of one share class may
be different than that of another over the same time period, even if both share classes
evidence ownership of the same firm. The 6-digit Committee on Uniform Securities
Identification Procedures (“CUSIP”) codes given for each firm in the initial M&A data
from the Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum database were matched with the 8-digit CUSIP
code for each unique equity security included in the CRSP/Compustat merged database.
My algorithms identified the unique equity security corresponding to each firm included
in this research in such a way that the class A (or first class issued) shares were included
in this research. Thus, the conclusions of this research may not easily extend to other
classes of shares which may be issued by firms.
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The development of the resulting daily equity return standard deviations of the
acquisitive firms during the post-transaction completion period is also interesting. While
the equity return volatilities of the non-acquisitive control group changed slightly on
average between the pre-transaction announcement to post-transaction completion
periods, the change was subtle and did not appear to occur within any particular month
or set of months during the post-transaction completion periods. This finding of an
insignificant change in the mean equity return volatilities of the non-acquisitive control
group across various time is consistent with extant research on aggregate equity return
volatilities over the historical period observed in this research (Morton 1996).
Significant patterns of change in the mean equity return volatilities of both groups
of acquisitive firms post-transaction completion are observed, however. The mean daily
equity return standard deviations of securities representing ownership in both the
acquisitive, diversifying firms and the acquisitive, non-diversifying firms are initially
heightened post-transaction completion relative the same firms’ pre-transaction
announcement mean equity return standard deviations. One can assume that this
observed increase in average equity return volatility is primarily driven by investors
working to incorporate new information resulting from the successful transaction
completion into the price of each relevant equity security. Interaction frictions between
the newly combined firms also provide capital market participants with novel information
that moves acquirers’ equity prices more aggressively, on average, than in the acquirers’
pre-transaction announcement periods, inflating the mean volatility of returns for a time.
These findings are consistent with previously completed research on post-transaction
completion equity return volatilities (Geppert & Kamerschen 2008). However, a
significant decrease in the mean equity return volatilities of both groups of acquisitive
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firms is observed between 4-10 months post-transaction completion, suggesting that
during this period a lowered level of novel information regarding the companies’ recently
completed transactions serves to lessen mean equity return volatilities. Mean equity
return volatility levels during months where firms typically report earnings appear to be
slightly higher during the period from 10-18 months post-transaction for both groups of
acquisitive firms and the non-acquisitive control group. These periodic increases in
average equity return volatility are most likely driven primarily by investors working to
price new information from earnings reports and financial filings as they are released to
the public.
The effects of dividend issuances on the returns of equity securities were not
accounted for when calculating the daily standard deviations included in the multiple
regression developed in this research. Although the issuance of dividends would have
influenced the observed percentage changes in the equity prices of the issuing firms, the
majority of the firms included in this research were relatively young and had yet to issue
a dividend by the date of each relevant acquisition announcement. This implies that any
dividends issuances which may have occured had a negligible effect on the mean daily
equity return standard deviations utilized in the multiple regression, and therefore should
not have significantly affected the results of my significance testing. The effects of
dividends were omitted primarily due to a lack of readily available dividend-related data
for the majority of the firms included in this research. If accurate and robust historical
dividend issuance records could be obtained for the companies included in this research,
this information could be used to adjust the calculated daily standard deviations of the
firms’ equity returns. These more accurate standard deviation values would increase the
accuracy of the results of the multiple regression developed in this research.
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VIII. Further Research
The body of research addressing the effects of mergers and acquisitions on the
volatility of equity security returns is far from complete. This paper has highlighted a
plethora of subjects which future researchers could attempt to treat. Further research
could focus on answering the same basic question this research attempted to answer
(namely, does the theoretically diversifying nature of certain M&A transactions have
significant effects on changes in the long-term equity return volatility of acquisitive
firms?) over different historical time periods, within specific industries over differing
periods of time, or while controlling for several of the the additional, omitted factors
discussed in the Conclusions and Discussion section of this paper. Whether or not the
degree to which an acquisitive firm is previously diversified affects the resulting change
in the acquirer’s equity return volatility post-transaction completion could be researched.
The effects on changes in an acquirer’s equity return volatility driven by the relative
market capitalization values of the acquirer and target firm could also be studied.
Future research could also attempt to uncover any significant differences in the
effects of diversifying mergers and acquisitions on the return volatility of different classes
of equity shares that acquirers may have previously issued. The development of a variable
which effectively and accurately controls for the effects of management’s choice of
transaction financing on an acquirer’s post-transaction completion equity return
volatility could also be pursued. Finally, additional research could be conducted to
establish which factors most significantly influence changes in the equity return volatility
of firms which have recently completed a diversifying acquisition to further improve the
results of the multiple regression developed in this research.
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Appendix
Section 1

t-test results
Table 1
Significant results for tested differences between the mean daily standard deviations of equity returns of
the group of acquisitive, diversifying firms during their pre-transaction announcement periods and the
group of acquisitive, diversifying firms during their post-transaction completion periods. This significant,
positive t-statistic indicates that there was a significant decrease in the mean daily equity return standard
deviation of the acquisitive, diversifying firms from the pre-transaction announcement to post-transaction
completion periods with a 95% level of confidence.

Paired t-test on the Distributions of Daily Equity Return
Standard Deviations of the Acquisitive, Diversifying Firms
360-Day Pre-Transaction
540-Day Post-Transaction
Announcement Period
Completion Period
Mean Daily σ
0.025
0.024
Variance In Daily σ
1.22E-04
1.87E-04
Observations
980
980
Pearson Correlation
0.574
Hypothesized Mean Difference
0
df
979
t Stat
3.351
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.000
t Critical two-tail

1.962
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Table 2
Insignificant results for tested differences between the mean daily standard deviations of equity returns of
the group of non-acquisitive control firms during their paired, pre-transaction announcement periods and
the group of non-acquisitive control firms during their paired, post-transaction completion periods. This
insignificant t-statistic indicates that there was not a significant change in the mean equity return standard
deviation of the non-acquisitive control firms from their paired, pre-transaction announcement to posttransaction completion periods with a 95% level of confidence.

Paired t-test on the Distributions of Daily Equity Return
Standard Deviations of the Non-Acquisitive Control Firms
360-Day Pre-Transaction
540-Day Post-Transaction
Announcement Period
Completion Period
Mean Daily σ
0.029
0.029
Variance In Daily σ
3.46E-04
1.17E-03
Observations
980
980
Pearson Correlation
0.434
Hypothesized Mean Difference
0
df
979
t Stat
1.936
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.053
t Critical two-tail

1.962

56

Table 3
Significant results for tested differences between the mean daily standard deviations of equity returns of
the group of acquisitive, diversifying firms during their pre-transaction announcement periods and the
group of non-acquisitive control firms during their paired, pre-transaction announcement periods. This
significant, negative t-statistic indicates that there was a significant difference between the mean daily
equity return standard deviations of the acquisitive, diversifying firms and the non-acquisitive control firms
during their pre-transaction announcement periods with a 95% level of confidence.

Paired t-test on the Distributions of Daily Equity Return
Standard Deviations During the Pre-Transaction Announcement Period
Acquisitive,
Non-Acquisitive
Diversifying Firms
Control Firms
Mean Daily σ
0.025
0.029
Variance In Daily σ
1.22E-04
3.46E-04
Observations
980
980
Pearson Correlation
0.363
Hypothesized Mean Difference
0
df
979
t Stat
-7.050
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.000
t Critical two-tail

1.962
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Table 4
Significant results for tested differences between the mean daily standard deviations of equity returns of
the group of acquisitive, diversifying firms during their post-transaction completion periods and the group
of non-acquisitive control firms during their paired, post-transaction completion periods. This significant,
negative t-statistic indicates that there was a significant difference between the mean daily equity return
standard deviations of the acquisitive, diversifying firms and the non-acquisitive control firms during their
post-transaction completion periods with a 95% level of confidence. Note that this t-statistic is more
negative than the t-statistic in Appendix table 3. This difference indicates that mean equity return standard
deviation of the group of acquisitive, diversifying firms became proportionately smaller than the mean
equity standard deviation of the non-acquisitive control firms between the pre-transaction announcement
and post-transaction completions periods. This negative change in t-statistics essentially constitutes a difdif measurement which reinforces the regression results which support my hypotheses.

Paired t-test on the Distributions of Daily Equity Return
Standard Deviations During the Post-Transaction Completion Period
Acquisitive,
Non-Acquisitive
Diversifying Firms
Control Firms
Mean Daily σ
0.024
0.029
Variance In Daily σ
1.87E-04
1.17E-03
Observations
980
980
Pearson Correlation
0.299
Hypothesized Mean Difference
0
df
979
t Stat
-7.097
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.000
t Critical two-tail

1.962
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Table 5
Insignificant results for tested differences between the mean daily standard deviations of equity returns of
the group of acquisitive, diversifying firms during their pre-transaction announcement periods and the
group of acquisitive, non-diversifying firms during their pre-transaction announcement periods. This
insignificant t-statistic indicates that there was no significant difference between the mean daily equity
return standard deviations of the acquisitive, diversifying firms and the acquisitive, non-diversifying firms
during their pre-transaction announcement periods with a 95% level of confidence. This was a two-sample
t-test that assumed unequal variances in the distributions of equity return standard deviations of the
acquisitive, diversifying firms and the acquisitive, non-diversifying firms (where either s1/s2 or s2/s1 > 2).

Two Sample t-test on the Distributions of Daily Equity Return
Standard Deviations During the Pre-Transaction Announcement Period
Acquisitive,
Acquisitive,
Diversifying Firms
Non-Diversifying Firms
Mean Daily σ
0.025
0.025
Variance In Daily σ
1.22E-04
2.67E-05
Observations
980
9256
Hypothesized Mean Difference
0
df
1025
t Stat
0.796
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.426
t Critical two-tail
1.962
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Table 6
Insignificant results for tested differences between the mean daily standard deviations of equity returns of
the group of acquisitive, diversifying firms during their post-transaction completion periods and the group
of acquisitive, non-diversifying firms during their post-transaction completion periods. This insignificant
t-statistic indicates that there was no significant difference between the mean daily equity return standard
deviations of the acquisitive, diversifying firms and the acquisitive, non-diversifying firms during their posttransaction completion periods with a 95% level of confidence. This was also a two-sample t-test that
assumed unequal variances in the distributions of equity return standard deviations of the acquisitive,
diversifying firms and the acquisitive, non-diversifying firms (where either s1/s2 or s2/s1 > 2). Again,
although both t-statistics are insignificant, note the differences between the t-statistic in this table and the
t-statistic in Appendix table 5. This difference indicates that mean equity return standard deviation of the
group of acquisitive, diversifying firms became proportionately smaller than the mean equity standard
deviation of the acquisitive, non-diversifying firms between the pre-transaction announcement and posttransaction completions periods, providing further support for my hypotheses.

Two Sample t-test on the Distributions of Daily Equity Return
Standard Deviations During the Post-Transaction Completion Period
Acquisitive,
Acquisitive,
Diversifying Firms
Non-Diversifying Firms
Mean Daily σ
0.024
0.025
Variance In Daily σ
1.87E-04
1.70E-01
Observations
980
9256
Hypothesized Mean Difference
0
df
9438
t Stat
-1.107
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.268
t Critical two-tail
1.960
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Table 7
Insignificant results for tested differences between the mean daily standard deviations of equity returns of
the group of acquisitive, non-diversifying firms during their pre-transaction announcement periods and the
group of acquisitive, non-diversifying firms during their post-transaction completion periods. This
insignificant t-stat indicates that there was not a significant change in the mean equity return standard
deviation of the acquisitive, non-diversifying firms from the pre-transaction announcement to posttransaction completion periods with a 95% level of confidence. Note the extremely low correlation
coefficient, which indicates that for the acquisitive, non-diversifying firms, each firm’s daily equity return
standard deviation during the pre-transaction announcement period gives very little information regarding
that same firm’s conditional, expected daily equity return standard deviation during the post-transaction
completion period.

Paired t-test on the Distributions of Daily Equity Return
Standard Deviations of the Acquisitive, Non-Diversifying Firms
360-Day Pre-Transaction
540-Day Post-Transaction
Announcement Period
Completion Period
Mean Daily σ
0.025
0.025
Variance In Daily σ
2.67E-05
1.70E-01
Observations
9256
9256
Pearson Correlation
-0.001
Hypothesized Mean Difference
0
df
9255
t Stat
0.063
P(T<=t) two-tail
0.950
t Critical two-tail

1.960

61

Section 2

Regression results
Table 8
The multiple regression statistics. Note the R2 value, implying that much of the change in a given firm’s
equity return volatility during the periods surrounding an M&A transaction is driven by idiosyncratic
developments.

Regression Statistics
Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations

0.387
0.150
0.148
0.020
3920
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Table 9
The results of the multiple regression. Note the significant, negative interaction factor coefficient
(Acquisition * Post-Completion).

Coefficients and Confidence Intervals
Intercept
ln(Firm Market Capitalization)
Inflation
Market Volatility During Period
Age of Firm
Acquisition
Post-Completion
Acquisition * Post-Completion

Coefficients
0.04780
-0.00175
-0.07571
1.19365
-0.00023
-0.00385
-0.00216
-0.00259

Standard Error
0.00224
0.00015
0.01587
0.07507
0.00003
0.00090
0.00090
0.00128
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t Stat
21.32344
-11.40430
-4.77105
15.89970
-8.82950
-4.26796
-2.38731
-2.03143

P-value
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00002
0.01702
0.04228

Lower 95%
0.04341
-0.00205
-0.10682
1.04646
-0.00028
-0.00561
-0.00393
-0.00510

Upper 95%
0.05220
-0.00145
-0.04460
1.34083
-0.00018
-0.00208
-0.00039
-0.00009

Section 3

Post-transaction completion mean equity return standard deviations

Table 10
Mean daily equity return standard deviations of the 980 acquisitive, diversifying firms during each monthly
period post-transaction completion, expressed as a percentage of the same firms’ 360-day pre-transaction
announcement period daily equity return standard deviation. Note the significant decrease in mean equity
return volatility between 4-10 months post-transaction completion.

Changes in Daily Equity Return Volatility: Acquisitive, Diversifying Group
Monthly Period
% of Pre-Transaction
Post-Transaction Completion
Announcement Period Volatility
0-1
102.3
1-2
101.8
2-3
102.6
3-4
102.0
4-5
101.9
5-6
100.8
6-7
100.3
7-8
99.3
8-9
99.7
9-10
98.6
10-11
99.1
11-12
98.2
12-13
98.4
13-14
98.0
14-15
98.3
15-16
98.2
16-17
98.0
17-18
98.1
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Table 11
Mean daily equity return standard deviations of the 980 non-acquisitive control firms during each monthly
period after their paired firms’ transaction completions, expressed as a percentage of the non-acquisitive
control firms’ mean, 360-day paired pre-transaction announcement period daily equity return standard
deviation. No pattern of change in the mean daily equity return standard deviations of this group is easily
observable.

Changes in Daily Equity Return Volatility: Non-Acquisitive Control Group
Monthly Period
% of Pre-Transaction
Post-Transaction Completion
Announcement Period Volatility
0-1
99.6
1-2
99.8
2-3
99.1
3-4
100.0
4-5
100.5
5-6
99.7
6-7
99.7
7-8
100.1
8-9
99.4
9-10
99.9
10-11
99.4
11-12
100.7
12-13
100.2
13-14
100.1
14-15
99.1
15-16
100.0
16-17
99.0
17-18
99.3
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Table 12
Mean daily equity return standard deviations of the 9256 acquisitive, non-diversifying firms during each
monthly period post-transaction completion, expressed as a percentage of the same firms’ 360-day pretransaction announcement period daily equity return standard deviation. Note the significant decrease in
mean equity return volatility between 4-10 months post-transaction completion.

Changes in Daily Equity Return Volatility: Acquisitive, Non-Diversifying Group
Monthly Period
% of Pre-Transaction
Post-Transaction Completion
Announcement Period Volatility
0-1
101.1
1-2
100.7
2-3
101.6
3-4
101.3
4-5
100.4
5-6
99.2
6-7
99.1
7-8
99.6
8-9
99.9
9-10
99.7
10-11
100.4
11-12
98.8
12-13
99.3
13-14
98.3
14-15
99.0
15-16
99.6
16-17
98.9
17-18
98.4
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Figure 1
Mean daily equity return standard deviations of each group of firms during each monthly period posttransaction completion, expressed as a percentage of the same groups’ mean 360-day pre-transaction
announcement period daily equity return standard deviation. Note the significant decrease in the mean
equity return standard deviations of both groups of acquisitive firms between 4-10 months post-transaction
completion.
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